Skip to content
Saudi Developer CommunitySaudi Developer Community

Menu


  • OT security
  • ICS
  • Cybersecurity

How did refrigeration systems become a cyber target?

Fajr Hamad Mohammed Almuqri – Cybersecurity4 min

On the night of 11–12 October 2026, the attacks did not target employees' devices or customer databases, but rather the control systems responsible for cooling food products in about 700 French commercial facilities.

The attackers managed to access the remote controllers and manipulate their settings, which led to changing the defrost cycles and raising temperatures, spoiling large quantities of food. French reports stated that fires broke out in at least 15 locations linked to the incident.

The attacks did not stop at France; in early November, incidents suspected of being linked to cyberattacks were recorded in at least nine European countries, including Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Sweden. These incidents caused refrigeration systems to fail and destroyed food products in dozens of stores.

But what do refrigerators have to do with cybersecurity, and how did the breach happen?

Major stores rely on industrial control systems (OT) to manage cooling and freezing operations. These systems consist of sensors to measure temperatures, electronic controllers, and central software that allows monitoring equipment and adjusting its settings remotely.

Because maintaining these systems sometimes requires remote access from service providers, some controllers are connected to the internet, and may offer administrative interfaces that can be accessed from outside the store's network.

This connection, if not properly secured, expands the attack surface and gives attackers an opportunity to try to access the control systems and manipulate their settings.

In the French incidents, the defrost settings were changed to operate in an abnormal way, causing temperatures in the cooling units to rise, reaching about 50 degrees Celsius in some cases.

The result was not merely a software malfunction, but spoilage of food products, disruption of operations, and major financial losses. Press reports estimated that total losses in France could reach tens of millions of euros.

Where was the security gap?

The French cybersecurity agency (CERT-FR), in its warning CERTFR-2026-ALE-012, pointed to the compromise of controllers from several companies, including:

  • Danfoss AK-SM and AK-SC

  • Copeland XWEB

  • Dixell XWEB

Among the most prominent weaknesses that made these systems more vulnerable were: administrative interfaces exposed on the internet, legacy devices that had reached end-of-life (EOL) security support, default or weak passwords, and poor securing of remote access.

A technical example of this is the vulnerability CVE-2025-41450 in Danfoss AK-SM8xxA controllers, which was researched by the Claroty Team82 team.

The vulnerability relates to a flaw in authentication (Authentication Bypass). The researchers revealed a hidden authentication mechanism known as the "Code of the Day," which relies on a daily code generated using the device's date, instead of the usual verification via the administrator password.

According to Claroty's analysis, the algorithm for generating this code can be reproduced and used to bypass the usual verification of administrator credentials, which could grant an attacker administrative privileges on the device's management interface. Danfoss has released updates to address the vulnerabilities discovered by the researchers.

However, it is important to clarify that there is no evidence confirming that this specific vulnerability was used in the European attacks. The existence of a vulnerability in a device does not necessarily mean it was the means of compromise in a particular incident. The CERT-FR warning also did not specify CVE numbers as the direct cause of the breach.

What do we learn from this incident?

These attacks reveal that operational technology (OT) systems are no less important than information technology (IT) systems in terms of protection.

While compromising an IT system may lead to data leakage or service disruption, compromising an OT system may change a real physical process; such as the temperature of a food warehouse, water pressure, or the operation of a production line.

To reduce these risks, organizations should:

Prevent direct access to OT system interfaces over the internet.

Use a secure VPN and multi-factor authentication (MFA) for remote access.

Update controllers and replace devices that have reached end-of-life security support.

Separate OT networks from IT networks, while controlling the communications permitted between them.

Monitor unusual changes in operational settings, not just network monitoring.

Conclusion

These incidents were not merely malfunctions in refrigeration systems, but a clear example of how a digital breach can turn into real material losses.

As devices and systems become increasingly connected to networks, protecting data alone is no longer enough; it has also become necessary to protect the systems that control the physical world.

Attribution of Attacks Aimed at Sabotage and Destabilization Targeting France(opens in a new tab)